

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS  
DALLAS DIVISION

OLUDELE OLADOJA,

§

Plaintiff,

§

V.

No. 3:24-cv-2709-K-BN

ZIA REHMAN,

§

Defendant.

§

**FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE  
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE**

Plaintiff Oludele Oladoja filed this *pro se* lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Zia Rehman, a staff physician at the Dallas County jail, alleging that the medical care that he received while incarcerated violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. *See* Dkt. No. 3.

United States District Judge Ed Kinkeade referred Oladoja's lawsuit to the undersigned United States magistrate judge for pretrial management under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and a standing order of reference.

The Court granted Oladoja leave to proceed *in forma pauperis* under the Prison Litigation Reform Act and ordered that the complaint be served. *See* Dkt. Nos. 4-8.

Rehman answered and asserted qualified immunity. *See* Dkt. No. 11. And, as ordered, *see* Dkt. Nos. 13 & 15, Rehman moved for summary judgment on qualified immunity, *see* Dkt. Nos. 17 & 18. After he did so, the Court entered an order on February 26, 2025 to allow Oladoja an opportunity to move for leave to conduct limited discovery in order to respond to the qualified immunity issues raised in the

summary judgment motion by March 27, 2025. *See* Dkt. No. 19.

Rehman then advised the Court that he was unable to serve the summary judgment motion on Oladoja at the last known address that Oladoja provided the Court. *See* Dkt. No. 20. The Court's February 26 order and a response from the clerk's office to a copy request made by Oladoja were both then returned as undeliverable. *See* Dkt. Nos. 21 & 22.

Considering this record, the undersigned enters these findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendation that the Court should dismiss this action without prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).

### **Discussion**

Rule 41(b) "authorizes the district court to dismiss an action *sua sponte* for failure to prosecute or comply with [a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure or] a court order." *Griggs v. S.G.E. Mgmt., L.L.C.*, 905 F.3d 835, 844 (5th Cir. 2018) (citing *McCullough v. Lynaugh*, 835 F.2d 1126, 1127 (5th Cir. 1988) (per curiam)); *accord Nottingham v. Warden, Bill Clements Unit*, 837 F.3d 438, 440 (5th Cir. 2016) (failure to comply with a court order); *Rosin v. Thaler*, 450 F. App'x 383, 383-84 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (failure to prosecute); *see also Campbell v. Wilkinson*, 988 F.3d 798, 800-01 (5th Cir. 2021) (holding that the text of Rule 41(b) does not extend to a failure to comply with a court's local rule insofar as that violation does not also qualify as a failure to prosecute (discussing *Berry v. CIGNA/RSI-CIGNA*, 975 F.2d 1188 (5th Cir. 1992))).

This authority "flows from the court's inherent power to control its docket and

prevent undue delays in the disposition of pending cases.” *Boudwin v. Graystone Ins. Co., Ltd.*, 756 F.2d 399, 401 (5th Cir. 1985) (citing *Link v. Wabash R.R. Co.*, 370 U.S. 626 (1962)); *see also Lopez v. Ark. Cnty. Indep. Sch. Dist.*, 570 F.2d 541, 544 (5th Cir. 1978) (“Although [Rule 41(b)] is phrased in terms of dismissal on the motion of the defendant, it is clear that the power is inherent in the court and may be exercised *sua sponte* whenever necessary to ‘achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.’” (quoting *Link*, 370 U.S. at 631)); *Campbell*, 988 F.3d at 800 (“It is well established that Rule 41(b) permits dismissal not only on motion of the defendant, but also on the court’s own motion.” (citing *Morris v. Ocean Sys., Inc.*, 730 F.2d 248, 251 (5th Cir. 1984) (citing, in turn, *Link*, 370 U.S. at 631))).

And the Court’s authority under Rule 41(b) is not diluted by a party proceeding *pro se*, as “[t]he right of self-representation does not exempt a party from compliance with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.” *Wright v. LBA Hospitality*, 754 F. App’x 298, 300 (5th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (quoting *Hulsey v. Texas*, 929 F.2d 168, 171 (5th Cir. 1991) (quoting, in turn, *Birl v. Estelle*, 660 F.2d 592, 593 (5th Cir. Nov. 1981))).

A Rule 41(b) dismissal may be with or without prejudice. *See Long v. Simmons*, 77 F.3d 878, 879-80 (5th Cir. 1996).

Although “[l]esser sanctions such as fines or dismissal without prejudice are usually appropriate before dismissing with prejudice, ... a Rule 41(b) dismissal is appropriate where there is ‘a clear record of delay or contumacious conduct by the plaintiff and when lesser sanctions would not serve the best interests of justice.’”

*Nottingham*, 837 F.3d at 441 (quoting *Bryson v. United States*, 553 F.3d 402, 403 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (in turn quoting *Callip v. Harris Cnty. Child Welfare Dep’t*,

757 F.2d 1513, 1521 (5th Cir. 1985)); *see also Long*, 77 F.3d at 880 (a dismissal with prejudice is appropriate only if the failure to comply with the court order was the result of purposeful delay or contumacious conduct and the imposition of lesser sanctions would be futile); *cf. Nottingham*, 837 F.3d at 442 (noting that “lesser sanctions” may “include assessments of fines, costs, or damages against the plaintiff, conditional dismissal, dismissal without prejudice, and explicit warnings” (quoting *Thrasher v. City of Amarillo*, 709 F.3d 509, 514 (5th Cir. 2013))).

“When a dismissal is without prejudice but ‘the applicable statute of limitations probably bars future litigation,’ that dismissal operates as – i.e., it is reviewed as – “a dismissal with prejudice.” *Griggs*, 905 F.3d at 844 (quoting *Nottingham*, 837 F.3d at 441); *see, e.g.*, *Wright*, 754 F. App’x at 300 (affirming dismissal under Rule 41(b) – potentially effectively with prejudice – where “[t]he district court had warned Wright of the consequences and ‘allowed [her] a second chance at obtaining service’ but she “disregarded that clear and reasonable order”).

At the outset of this case, the Court advised Oladoja that he must “notify the Court of any change of address by filing a written Notice of Change of Address with the Clerk. Failure to file such notice may result in this case being dismissed for want of prosecution.” Dkt. No. 7, ¶ 5. And he did so early on. *See* Dkt. No. 9. But Oladoja’s failure to keep the Court updated as to his address – in addition to leaving the impression that he no longer wishes to pursue the claims in this lawsuit – has prevented this action from proceeding and amounts to a failure to prosecute.

A Rule 41(b) dismissal of this lawsuit without prejudice is therefore warranted

under these circumstances and to the extent provided below.

Because the undersigned concludes that lesser sanctions would be futile, as the Court is not required to delay the disposition of this case until Oladoja elects to follow the Court's order to keep his address up to date or otherwise contact the Court, the Court should exercise its inherent power to prevent undue delays in the disposition of pending cases and *sua sponte* dismiss this action without prejudice under Rule 41(b).

And, while it is not apparent based on the record here that dismissal of this lawsuit without prejudice at this time would effectively be a dismissal with prejudice, insofar as the recommended dismissal may somehow prejudice Oladoja, these findings, conclusions, and recommendation provide notice, and the opportunity to file objections (as further explained below) provides a means to respond, to explain why this case should not be dismissed for the reasons set out above. *See Carver v. Atwood*, 18 F.4th 494, 498 (5th Cir. 2021) (“The broad rule is that ‘a district court may dismiss a claim on its own motion as long as the procedure employed is fair.’ More specifically, ‘fairness in this context requires both notice of the court’s intention and an opportunity to respond’ before dismissing *sua sponte* with prejudice.” (citations omitted)).

### **Recommendation**

The Court should dismiss this action without prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).

A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on

all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being served with a copy. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the magistrate judge's findings, conclusions, and recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. *See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n*, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).

DATED: May 12, 2025



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DAVID L. HORAN  
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE